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Incentive-Based  Solutions  to Agricultural
Environmental Problems:  Recent
Developments  in Theory and Practice
Alan  Randall and Michael  A.  Taylor
ABSTRACT
Theory  predicts  that  incentive-based  regulatory  instruments  reduce  compliance  costs  by
encouraging  efficient resource  allocation and innovation  in environmental technology.  Cost
reductions  from  pollution  permit trading  often have  exceeded  expectations,  but the  devil
is  in  the  details:  the  rules  matter.  In recent  years,  IB  instruments  of many  kinds,  from
permit trading  to various  informal  voluntary  agreements,  have  been  introduced  in many
countries.  Point-nonpoint trading  programs  have been established  in the U.S., but recorded
trades have  been rare.  We speculate  about prospects  for performance-based  monitoring  of
agricultural  nonpoint pollution  which,  we believe,  would encourage  trading  to the benefit
of farmers  and society.
In  recent  years,  incentive-based  (IB)  ap-
proaches  to  environmental  regulation  have
found increasing  application. The basic idea-
that IB regulatory  instruments  provide  a level
of flexibility that is  absent in traditional  com-
mand-and-control  (CAC)  approaches  and
thereby  reduce  compliance  costs  by  encour-
aging  efficient  resource  allocation  and  inno-
vation  in  environmental  technology-can  be
found in the economic  literature  since Pigou's
proposal to tax externalities and Crocker's pol-
lution-permit  trading  proposal.  Implementa-
tion  of  IB  policies  proceeded  slowly  at  first:
pollution  charges  have  been  imposed  in  cer-
tain  particular  instances  in  Europe  since  the
1960s,  and the US mounted some initial forays
into pollution trading in the early  1980s. More
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recently,  however,  more countries  have adopt-
ed  IB  instruments  and  the  array  of environ-
mental problems  to  which the instruments  are
being applied  has been expanding  rapidly.
We  plan to conclude  this article with some
rather  specific  suggestions  concerning  point-
nonpoint  pollution  permit  trading.  Along  the
way we  will touch on  the conceptual  founda-
tions of IB  approaches  and provide  some  ev-
idence  of their  increasing  application  in  the
policy  arena  and  their effectiveness.  Most  of
the early  applications  have  been  to  industrial
and municipal point sources. Nevertheless,  we
will be  alert  to  developments  in  the  agricul-
tural  sector,  which has been relatively  slow  to
embrace IB  approaches.
Incentive-based  approaches  encompass  a
wide  variety  of policy  instruments  that  have
in  common  the  intent  to  reward,  rather  than
mandate,  environment-enhancing  behavior.
Here,  we abandon all hope of comprehensive-
ness, ignoring  entirely the rich tradition of Pi-
govian  taxes  to  concentrate  on  voluntary
agreements  and  trading  mechanisms.  WithinJournal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2000
even this narrowed scope we will be less com-
prehensive  and  more  eclectic  and  anecdotal
than  might be desirable.
Background
A  Perspective on Market Failure
Economists  have  traditionally  diagnosed  en-
vironmental  problems  as  market  failures:  the
failure  of  markets  to transmit  appropriate  in-
centives  and  thereby  achieve efficiency.  Con-
ventional  solutions  call  unambiguously  for
government action  to tax or regulate  external-
ities  and  to  raise  revenue  for  public  projects
to provide  public  goods.
The  "market  failure,  government  fix"  di-
agnosis  and  prescription  have  fallen  under
concerted  attack  from  individualists  arguing
that allocative inefficiencies  are caused mostly
by  incomplete  property  rights-and  therefore
privatization  is  the  appropriate  policy  re-
sponse-and  asking  what  policy  implications
could  possibly arise from market failure when
the failures  of government  are even more  per-
vasive.
Mercifully,  we  are  no  longer  asked  to
choose  between  these  two  paradigms,  with
their  mutually antagonistic  diagnoses and pre-
scriptions. There  is an important class of prob-
lems,  called  isolation paradoxes, where insis-
tence  on individual  action  or none  at  all  can
leave  everyone  isolated  and  ineffective,  and
the  search  for  arrangements  that  make  coor-
dinated action  beneficial  to all concerned  may
be rewarding. Abstract theory (from game the-
ory,  political  science,  and  economics)  and
emerging  experience  have  broken  down  the
old  simplistic  dichotomy  of  government  vs.
market  solutions.  The  isolation  paradox  con-
cept  suggests  openness  to  solutions  that  in-
voke  a  variety  of  institutional  forms.  These
include  private  enterprises,  voluntary  associa-
tions,  and government  ranging  from the most
local  level  to  the  national  scale  and  beyond
(Randall  1999).  Given the  centrality  of infor-
mation  and coordination,  the array  of feasible
institutions  is continually  shifting  as  informa-
tion,  communication,  and exclusion  technolo-
gies develop.  For particular  problems,  the  ap-
propriate  institutions  will  be  consistent  with
the dimensions  and  scale of the problem itself
and  with the  prevailing  technologies  and  po-
litical  realities.  Flexibility  is  the  key  in  both
institutional forms and the incentives those in-
stitutions transmit.
Isolation  paradoxes  abound  in  agriculture.
Agricultural  nonpoint  sources  are  now  the
leading  cause of water pollution  in most areas
of the United States (Davies and Mazurek) and
can  therefore expect to come under increasing
regulatory  scrutiny.  However,  the difficulty of
monitoring  nonpoint  sources  has thus  far pre-
cluded  the  public  from enjoying  the  benefits
of adequate  controls  and  farmers  from profit-
ing  from  gainful  permit  trades.  Another  ex-
ample  is  biodiversity  and  habitat  protection,
where  fragmentation  of land  into private  par-
cels  and  failure  to  devise  incentives  for  co-
operation  among landowners  have  denied  the
public  adequate  provision  for biodiversity  and
farmers the  opportunity  to profit from the po-
tential  value  of  their  land  as  habitat.  Eclecti-
cism in institutional  innovation will be essen-
tial to progress  in resolving  many of the most
persistent  environmental  problems  of agricul-
ture.
Pollution Permit Trading
Economists  have  long  argued  for  policy  in-
struments  that  take  maximum  advantage  of
voluntary exchange  with its efficiency  and Pa-
reto-safety  properties.  Political  scientists  fre-
quently  make  similar  arguments,  albeit  in
more  accessible  terminology,  when  they  call
for  win-win  solutions.  Trading  mechanisms
are  being  implemented  in  air  and  water pol-
lution  control,  wetlands  and shoreline  mitiga-
tion,  land swaps to meet habitat protection and
similar objectives,  and resources-for-resources
compensation  provisions  for  natural  resource
damages  (e.g.,  the Superfund  law and the Oil
Pollution  Act).
Economic  Theory.  Economists  since
Crocker and  Dales have argued,  on  efficiency
grounds,  for establishing  markets  in  rights  to
pollute.  Most pollution  market  proposals  call
for  tradable  pollution  reduction  credits  (usu-
ally  called  permits), which  establish  property
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rights (in terms  of allowable  discharges) with-
in a public  goods setting.  Efficiency would be
served,  as  low-cost  abaters  reduced  their  dis-
charges  and permits  were  reallocated  to  their
highest valued uses through market exchange,
and  innovation  in  cost-efficient  abatement
technology  would  be  encouraged.  Various
forms  of  property  rights  have  been  incorpo-
rated within tradable permit systems suggested
in  the  literature  (Montgomery;  Krupnick,  et
al.;  McGartland  and  Oates;  Tietenberg;
McGartland).  Empirical  simulations  have
shown  that regulatory  costs under  CAC  poli-
cies  may be  several  times  those of incentive-
based policies (Atkinson  and Lewis;  Roach, et
al.; Hahn  and  Noll;  Seskin,  et al.).  The  cost
savings  claimed  for  IB  approaches,  such  as
tradable  permit markets,  derive  from their ca-
pacity  to take  advantage  of differences  in  the
cost  of pollution  abatement  across  firms  and
to  provide incentives  for  innovation in  pollu-
tion abatement.
First Steps: Air and Water Control in the
US.  Economists'  proposals  for pollution  trad-
ing  were roundly  criticized by environmental-
ists  and  largely  ignored  by  government
throughout  the  1960s  and  '70s.  The  US EPA
took its  first  steps toward  pollution  trading in
1980-introducing  offsets,  banks,  and  bub-
bles, initially for point sources of air pollution.
In  the  early  1990s,  trading  in  sulfur  oxides
(SOx)  permits  was introduced  on the Chicago
Board  of  Trade.  Economists  were  surprised
that  trading  was  less  active  and  the  price  of
permits  was  lower  than  they  had  predicted
(Joskow,  Schmalensee,  and  Bailey).  A  plau-
sible explanation  is that the switch from CAC
regulation  to permit  trading is actually  a two-
step  process:  first,  the  switch  from regulation
of  control  technology  to  performance  stan-
dards  that  allow  the firm  to choose  its  abate-
ment technology  and, then,  the introduction of
trading  (Burtraw).  It is likely that the first step
generates  major savings in abatement costs, al-
lowing  firms  to  delay  purchasing  permits.
Subsequent  experience  has  been  consistent
with  that  conjecture,  in  that  the  volume  of
trades  has  increased  over time,  but the  price
of permits  remains  lower  than  was  predicted
ex ante.
Expanding the Scope of IB Instruments
The United States. In the US, the current trend
is to encourage  adoption of trading and related
IB instruments,  instead of traditional  CAC ap-
proaches,  to address a broad range of environ-
mental problems  (Keohane, et al.). Watershed-
based  trading  involves  the exchange  of water
quality  or other  ecological  improvements  be-
tween  individuals  responding  to  private  mar-
ket  incentives  (USEPA).  Trading  institutions,
in forms ranging from tradable permit markets
to wetlands mitigation,  have increasingly been
used for protection  of water quality  (USEPA;
Netusil  and  Braden;  Keohane,  et al.; Stavins
and  Whitehead).  Public  trustees  pressing
claims  for  compensation  for  natural  resource
injury are  now less inclined  to assess the com-
pensating  monetary  payment,  seeking  instead
to  determine  the  compensating  scale  of  re-
source  restoration (Randall  1997).
IB  Instruments  in  Other  Countries.  The
move  to more  flexible  regulations  is not lim-
ited  to the  United  States.  The  role of IB reg-
ulations  has grown  in prominence  throughout
the  world,  as  has  the  diversity  of  the  policy
instruments.  Traditionally,  tradable  permits
were  seen  as  a  uniquely  American  preoccu-
pation;  in  Europe and  much of the  world,  se-
rious consideration  of IB instruments was lim-
ited to  environmental  taxes.  This is  changing,
as Australia,  Canada, and Mexico all currently
operate  tradable permit  systems for some par-
ticular environmental problems,  and Denmark,
Poland, the Netherlands, Norway and the U.K.
are  considering  their introduction  for  the first
time (OECD).
Perhaps  the  most  important  shift  in  envi-
ronmental  regulation  in  Western  Europe  has
been  centered  on  the use  of voluntary  agree-
ments.  Voluntary  agreements,  negotiated
agreements  in  particular,  have become  a  very
popular policy  tool  since the early  1980s.  Ne-
gotiated  agreements are  contracts that are  cre-
ated  between  regulatory  authorities  and  the
regulated  firm  or industry.  Unlike  traditional
unilateral  regulation,  both  the  regulated  and
regulator  contribute  to  policy  formulation.
This type of solution is being applied to a wide
223Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2000
Table  1.  Diversity  of  Environmental  Issues
Covered  by Voluntary  Agreements
Agri-  Total
culture  Energy Industry  VA's
Austria  /  20
Belgium  /  6
Denmark  /  /  / 16
Finland  /  2
France  V / /  8
Germany  /  /'  93
Greece  /  '  72
Ireland  /  1
Italy  '  11
Luxembourg  /  5
Netherlands  /  /  J'  107
Portugal  /  v  10
Spain  ,  6
Sweden  / /  /  11
United  Kingdom  /  9
EU  Total  ,  305
Source: EEA,  1997.
variety  of environmental  issues, including  ag-
riculture  (Table  1).
The  term  voluntary  agreement covers  a
wide  range  of agreements  ranging  from vol-
untary  'codes  of  conduct'  to  legally  binding
agreements.  In  general,  they  include  all  com-
mitments  undertaken  by  firms  and  sector  as-
sociations,  which are the result of negotiations
with  public  authorities  and/or  explicitly  rec-
ognized  by  the  authorities  (EEA).  The  term
voluntary agreement can  be  misleading  as  it
can also be applied to agreements reached un-
der  coercion  in the  form  of future  legislative
threats  (Segerson  and Miceli).
In  Eastern  Europe,  introduction  of pollu-
tion trading is impeded by the larger challenge
of  (re)introducing  markets  in  general  and  es-
tablishing  a structure of property  rights to sup-
port  them.  Nevertheless,  the  first  Polish  ex-
periment with  transferable permits for volatile
organic  compounds  in Chorz6w, while  requir-
ing  complicated  and painstaking  legal maneu-
vers,  proved very  successful  in  bringing visi-
ble improvements more rapidly  and at a lower
cost  than  those  attainable  through  traditional
instruments  (OECD).  However,  wider  repli-
cation  cannot  be  contemplated  without  major
changes  in laws.
In  Australia,  there has  been a  shift toward
market  institutions  for handling  things previ-
ously mediated  by rigid  bureaucracy;  one  ex-
ample is the emergence of water markets.  This
change  in  thinking  has  influenced  environ-
mental  policy.  Trading  in  salinity  reduction
credits  in  the  Hunter  River  (where  the  coal
industry  discharges  saline  water)  was  intro-
duced  on  a  pilot basis  in  1995  and  continues
(SSC).  In  the  Hawkesbury-Nepean  river  sys-
tem  (a  highly  productive  agricultural  region
experiencing  urbanization  pressures  from the
growth of the Sydney  metropolitan area), high
nutrient loads  have been attacked by issuing a
bubble  license  involving  the  major  sewage
dischargers  (EA).
Some  Stylized Facts about the Performance
of IB Instruments
Compliance  Cost Savings:  a  Clear Benefit.
Pollution  trading programs  have  typically ex-
ceeded  expectations,  in  that  total  discharge
limits  are  attained  with  cost-savings  greater
than  predicted  at  the  outset.  A  plausible  ex-
planation  is that  moving  to  a  tradable  permit
market involves two steps:  a  switch to perfor-
mance  standards  and the  introduction  of trad-
ing. The switch  to performance  standards pro-
vides  private  incentives-absent  under  CAC
regulations-to  find  cost-efficient  abatement
methods,  generating  cost  savings  in  addition
to those  afforded by  trading  of permits.
"Innovation Offsets"? Porter  and  van  der
Linde  suggest  that in a  dynamic  setting prop-
erly  designed environmental  policies  can trig-
ger innovations that offset the increase in com-
pliance  costs,  partially,  completely,  or  even
more  than completely.  Their claim  is that ex-
plicit environmental  improvement policies can
reduce  the  uncertainty  that  investments  ad-
dressing  pollution abatement  will be  valuable
and motivate innovation and progress  (similar
to  the  creative  force  of the  market).  Innova-
tions  can  be  developed  and  implemented  to
decrease  environmental  impacts  while  simul-
taneously improving the product and/or the re-
lated production  process  leading to these  "in-
novation  offsets"  (Porter and  van der Linde).
The  proper  policy  instruments  for  achieving
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such  offsets  emphasize  the use  of private in-
centives,  by leaving  the  approach  to  innova-
tion in  the hands  of the producer  (Porter and
van  der  Linde).  The  "Porter  hypothesis"  has
attracted  critics  who  deny  its  plausibility,
claiming  that  while  offsets  are  theoretically
possible,  they  are likely  to be rare  or small in
practice.
For  "end-of-the-pipe"  pollution  controls,
offsetting  productivity  gains  or  cost  savings
seem unlikely.  However,  a  plausible theoreti-
cal  case  can  be  made  for offsets  in  the  case
where pollution controls can be integrated into
production  processes. Dixit and Pindyck argue
that due to uncertainties  of various kinds firms
tend to replace productive assets less frequent-
ly than  seems  economically  optimal.  Produc-
tive assets  typically  are  replaced with techno-
logically  enhanced  assets,  and  uncertainty
about  the  nature  of  technological  enhance-
ments to be introduced in "next year's model"
may  induce  delays  in  asset  replacement.  The
need  to  meet  an  environmental  performance
standard may  induce investment  in a new and
technologically  enhanced  integrated  produc-
tion and pollution  control  system  so that effi-
ciency  gains in production  offset all or part of
the  pollution  control  costs.  Purvis,  et  al.
showed  that  certain  livestock  waste  control
practices  offer  advantages  for both productiv-
ity-augmentation  and pollution abatement.
The  Problem of  Uncertainty. A  common
impediment  to  all  trading  programs  is uncer-
tainty  of various  kinds  (Carlson  and  Sholtz;
USGAO;  Purvis,  et al.).  Trading  will  be  in-
hibited  by  market  participants'  uncertainty
about  future  total  discharge  limits,  enforce-
ment of existing  policies,  and the cost and ef-
fectiveness of control technologies. As we will
see  below,  uncertainty  may  afflict  the regula-
tory community,  too. For example,  regulators
motivated to meet environmental performance
goals  may  hedge  against  uncertain  perfor-
mance  of control  technologies  by  specifying
high trading-ratios  (t-ratios), which provide an
environmental  safety  margin  but  impede
trades  and  limit  the  effectiveness  of  trading
programs.
Wetlands  Mitigation
The  preservation  of wetlands  has  gained  at-
tention in recent years as the acreage of natural
wetlands  has  declined.  There  are  essentially
two types  of wetland  policies  in  the US. The
Wetland  Reserve  Program  represents  the tra-
ditional  approach:  a  federal  incentive  system
that  pays  farmers  to  preserve  and  enhance
wetlands.  Section  404 of the Clean Water Act
introduces  a  regulatory  approach,  mandating
"no  net loss"  of remaining  natural  wetlands.
However,  Section  404 contains  an interesting
provision  that allows  individuals  who wish to
drain wetlands  in one  location to  mitigate the
loss  by enhancing  wetlands elsewhere.
Land developers must apply for a permit to
alter any existing  wetland.  The regulator eval-
uates the physical qualities of the wetland  and
determines  whether  the  applicant  must  mini-
mize  the  impact  of development  or offset  or
minimize  negative  impacts  on  wetlands.  On-
site  offsets  include  setbacks  and  filter  strips
designed  to  minimize  degradation  of  the  di-
rectly impacted  wetlands.  However,  it can  of-
ten be  more  effective  to  permit  offsets  to be
implemented  offsite.  The  developer  pays  to
create  new  wetlands  or  improve  an  existing
offsite  wetland.  The regulatory  goal is  to  re-
quire that loss  of impacted wetlands be offset
by  addition  or  enhancement  of  wetlands  of
higher ecological  quality  within the  same hy-
drological  and ecological  region.
The  effectiveness  of constructed  wetlands
is  uncertain,  and  some  observers  claim  that
constructed  wetlands  typically  are  inferior  to
natural  wetlands.  To compensate,  a mitigation
ratio is imposed by the regulator (i.e., EPA and
the Army Corps of Engineers), requiring more
than one acre of constructed wetlands  to offset
the loss  of a  single  acre of existing  wetlands.
The most common  mitigation ratio  is  1.5:1  in
Ohio,  but ratios of 3:1  or more have been im-
posed for high quality  and/or particularly  sen-
sitive  wetlands.  However,  this  ratio  can  be
even greater if the impacted wetlands  are  of a
higher  quality.  The  mitigation  ratio  is  deter-
mined on  a case-by-case  basis during the per-
mit process.
Wetlands  exhibit  economies  of  scale  and
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scope,  in that larger  wetlands tend  to support
more diverse  and productive  ecosystems  than
small  ones.  Provision of larger and better wet-
lands  is  a  classic  isolation  paradox  such  as
those  affecting  many  ecosystem  issues:  for
many  kinds  of ecosystems,  protection  of bio-
diversity  requires  large  areas  of  contiguous
habitat.  This  is  feasible  only  if  considerable
numbers  of  independent  landowners  can  be
encouraged  to cooperate  with each  other and,
often,  to cooperate  with public  land  agencies.
Private  mitigation  banking  creates  incentives
for such cooperation.
Wetlands Mitigation Banks.  Mitigation
banks  are  large  constructed  wetlands  created
for the sole purpose of providing future offsets
for wetland loss due to conversion. The banker
sells  acreage in the constructed  wetland to de-
velopers  and others  who are  required to offset
wetlands  conversion  in  the  same  ecological
and  hydrological  region.  Twenty  states  have
established  mitigation banking  policies.  Some
local  communities,  such  as  Eugene,  Oregon,
have  established local  mitigation banking  pol-
icies  as  well.  Nationwide,  mitigation  costs
vary from  $7500  to  $60,000  per acre,  and as
of January  1997,  over 200 wetland  mitigation
banks,  mostly nonprofit,  were  in operation  or
under  development  in  the United  States,  with
at least one  in each state  (Environmental  Law
Institute,  1998).  Forty  for-profit  mitigation
banks  have  been  approved  and  another  75
have  been  submitted  for  approval  (Environ-
mental  Law  Institute).  Florida has  18  mitiga-
tion  banks  with  more  than  20,000  acres  of
wetlands,  and mitigation  banking constitutes a
$750-million  industry  in  the  state  (Environ-
mental  Law  Institute).
The  Ohio  Wetlands  Foundation  is  a  non-
profit  organization  that  creates  constructed
wetlands  banks  and  sells  acreage  to  land  de-
velopers  for  offsetting  purposes.  Since  1993,
the  Foundation  has  sold  out  three  separate
banks  ranging  in  size  from  33  acres  to  330
acres (Sutliff).  Mitigation banking allows mar-
ginal wetlands to be put to more valuable uses,
while maintaining,  and in some cases increas-
ing, the total amount of high-quality wetlands.
Toward Performance Standards. The  eco-
logical  functions  of  a  wetland  involve  com-
plex ecological  interactions  that are difficult to
measure  and  monitor and,  especially  for con-
structed wetlands,  are subject to uncertain time
paths.  Standards  for  environmental  perfor-
mance  are  difficult  to  implement,  so  design
(i.e.,  technology)  standards  have  been  the
norm.  The agency  approves the plans for con-
structed  wetlands and will  set measurable  im-
plementation  goals that are fairly good predic-
tors  of  ecological  function.  Nevertheless,
mitigation banking is arguably impeded by the
widespread  use  of  relatively  high  mitigation
ratios,  while  environmental  performance  of
constructed  wetlands  has been  spotty enough
to  generate  skepticism  among environmental-
ists  (Marsh et al.).
The  Army  Corps  of  Engineers  has  pro-
posed  and  is the  process  of  requiring  all  na-
tionwide  permits to be based on the use of the
hydrogeomorphic  (HGM)  approach  to assess-
ment  of wetland  functions (Federal  Register).
HGM  works in three stages:  first, wetlands  are
classified  on  the  basis  of their  differences  in
functioning  (landscape  setting,  water  source,
hydrodynamics);  then  the  functions  that each
class  of wetlands  performs  are  defined;  and,
finally,  references  are  used  to  establish  the
range of functioning  of the wetland. This pro-
posal  is intended to move wetlands mitigation
closer  to  accomplishing  in-kind  replacement
of  lost  wetlands.  Thus,  the  HGM  approach
represents  a  shift  toward  performance  stan-
dards  for  wetlands  mitigation,  as  regulatory
agencies  respond  to  public  anxiety  about  the
performance  of constructed wetlands.
Point-Nonpoint Pollution Trading
Agricultural nonpoint sources are currently the
leading cause  of water pollution in most areas
of  the  United  States  (Davies  and  Mazurek).
Yet they have avoided intense regulatory scru-
tiny  until  fairly  recently,  due  perhaps  to  the
long-standing tradition of using subsidies rath-
er  than  regulatory  pressure  to  influence  the
performance  of agriculture  and the claim that
regulation  is impractical  in that it is inherently
difficult to identify  individual contributions  to
nonpoint pollution  loads. The result is that ag-
ricultural  nonpoint  sources  have  been  ad-
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dressed  mostly  by  specifying  best  manage-
ment  practices  (BMPs)-if used  as  standards,
BMPs  are  technology  standards-which  are
encouraged  mostly  by  subsidies  of  various
kinds.
In recent  years,  however,  the US  EPA has
encouraged  point-nonpoint  pollution  trading
programs  in  which  farmers  implementing
BMPs  would  earn  pollution reduction  credits
to be sold  to point-source  polluters.  EPA  lists
13  existing  point/nonpoint  trading  programs,
and  a  similar  number  are  under  development
or consideration.  Agricultural  sources  of pol-
lution  are  included  in  the  majority  of  these
trading  markets.  Programs  are  set  up  at  the
catchment  or sub-catchment  level. Several lev-
els  of government  are  involved,  as  are  point-
source polluters, who may be private or public
organizations,  and  nonpoint-source  polluters.
These  trading programs  simultaneously  intro-
duced  a  number  of  innovations  in  pollution
control  policy:  (1)  point  sources  of pollution
were  switched  from  command-and-control
technology  standards  to  performance  stan-
dards,  (2)  economic  incentives  were  intro-
duced via permit trading opportunities,  and (3)
point  sources  in need  of credits  contract with
nonpoint  polluters  collectively.  Of  these  in-
novations,  the  first  two  are  classic  IB  instru-
ments, while the third solves the isolation par-
adox  by  providing  benefits  (i.e.,  income  from
the  sale  of abatement  credits)  to  all members
of  the  group  whenever  a  group  target  is
achieved.
Here  we  describe  briefly  the situation  and
performance to date for three trading programs
that represent  the  existing  range  from formal
markets  to informal  voluntary  agreements.
Tar-Pamlico River Basin, North Carolina
High  nitrogen  and  phosphorous  levels  within
the Tar-Pamlico  river basin  led to  eutrophica-
tion and fish  kills.  To  deal with the problems,
a permit trading system was  created to reduce
nitrogen  and  phosphorous  loadings  at  low
cost.  The  participants  in  the  trading  markets
consisted of  13  point sources  (12  water treat-
ment works  and one private  firm) and numer-
ous  nonpoint  sources  within  the  watershed
(primarily  cropland  and livestock).  The  point
sources  organized  themselves  into  a  single
group, referred  to as the Association. The As-
sociation  placed  all  individual  point  sources
under  a single  "bubble."  If the total loadings
attributable  to  the  Association  exceed  the  al-
lowable  nutrient  load,  then  members  are  re-
quired  to  purchase offsetting  nonpoint  source
abatement.
Permit  prices  are  not  established  by  text-
book  market equilibrium.  Based on a comput-
er  simulation  of  potential  trades,  the price  of
a  tradable  permit was  set  for  the market  at  a
weighted  average  of  $29  per kg  of nitrogen/
per  year  (Gannon).  Credits  are  good  for  10
years.  The regulator  sets the trading ratio at 3:
1 for  crop  agriculture  and  2:1  for  livestock,
based  on  estimations  of  best  management
practice  performance  and  expected  costs (US
EPA).  The North Carolina Department  of Soil
and  Water  Conservation  arranges  "trades"
through  the  North  Carolina  agricultural  cost-
share program.  Should the Association violate
its aggregate  standard, it is required to deposit
funds  into  the  existing  cost-share  program.
These funds are earmarked for programs in the
Tar-Pamlico  Basin  and are used to enroll more
land in the cost-share  program.
The  Association  is  required  to  maintain  a
minimum $500,000 annual reserve  in the Ag-
ricultural Cost Share Program; to date this has
grown  to  $1,031,000.  This ensures  the  avail-
ability of funds for the implementation  of any
potentially  required trades.  Since  the  Associ-
ation is not involved  in the implementation  of
trades  it  does  not carry  the  responsibility  of
ensuring  compliance  by  the  nonpoint  source
trading  partner  (Gannon).  Instead,  the  State,
through  Soil and Water  Conservation  District
officials,  bears  the  cost  of inspection  and en-
forcement of compliance.  This arrangement  is
thought to relieve the point sources  of bearing
excessive risk through trading.
In summary,  while  the US EPA  is pleased
to  promote  these  arrangements  as  point-non-
point pollution trading, they are in fact a rather
rigid kind  of trading  and  the  regulator's  role
is  more  prominent  than  the  term  trading or-
dinarily  suggests.
To  date,  no  mandatory  trades  have  oc-
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curred  between  point  and  nonpoint  sources
within  the  Tar-Pamlico  market.  However,  the
Association  has  purchased  some  nonpoint-
source  credits  to offset potential  future needs.
In  addition,  point-source  trading  within  the
Association  bubble  is  reported  to be  very ac-
tive. During Phase  I of the market's formation,
each point  source  was required  to perform  an
engineering  analysis  of  its  management  and
operation  practices  for  pollution  abatement
(Hall  and  Howett).  As  a result  of these  anal-
yses, many new low-cost methods of pollution
abatement  were  implemented.  In  response  to
the flexibility derived from the switch to a per-
formance  standard  the point sources were able
to  abate  nitrogen  and  phosphorous  discharge
directly,  and  trading  was  not  required.  Asso-
ciation  members  still remain  well below  their
allowances.  Therefore,  trades  are  not  antici-
pated for  a few  years (Gannon).
Laguna Del Santa Rosa
Laguna  de  Santa  Rosa,  California,  is the  site
of an informal  trading  arrangement.  The  City
of Santa Rosa faced  difficulties in meeting wa-
ter  quality  standards  during  the  summer
months.  Instead  of  increased  abatement  ef-
forts,  the  city  shipped  treated  wastewater  to
area  golf courses  as  well as  dairies  and farms
for application to pasture  and some food crops
(Smith).  No  overall  trading mechanism  exists
and trades  are not  reflected  within the City of
Santa  Rosa's NPDES,  but they  are  accounted
for  within  the  Total  Maximum  Daily  Load
(Smith).  The  city  initially paid  dairies  to take
the water, but payments are no longer made due
to  the  desirability  of the nutrient  content  (US
EPA).  Local  governments  enforce  noncompli-
ance  problems  against  the  farmer  or rancher
who  applies  the wastewater  to fields  (Smith).
Boulder Creek,  Colorado
Within a  15.5-mile  segment of Boulder Creek,
a  trading  program  was  established  to  reduce
ammonia  levels  contributed  by  point-source
wastewater  treatment plants  and nonpoint  ag-
ricultural  sources.  High water temperature  and
pH  were  identified  as  the  primary  causes  of
increased  ammonia  levels,  which were  linked
to  the  physical  degradation  of the  creek's  ri-
parian  zone.  Reducing  the ammonia levels  re-
quired  cooperation  of both  point  sources  and
nonpoint sources.  Various forms of direct non-
point-source  abatement  offsets  were  made
available to the point source (the City of Boul-
der's  Public  Works  Department)  to  meet am-
monia reduction  levels. Point sources have the
option of reducing  ammonia discharge directly
or of increasing  stream capacity  for  ammonia
by funding projects which will return the creek
to its original  flow  (i.e.,  removal  of structural
diversions),  and/or projects which reduce non-
point-source  impacts  (i.e.,  paying  farmers  to
fence  livestock  out  of the  riparian  zone)  (US
EPA).  The point source has upgraded its plant
to meet  current regulatory  standards,  and has
opted  to adopt  these unconventional  pollution
offsets  in  anticipation  of  future  abatement
needs.
Improving the Prospects  for Point-Nonpoint
Permit Trading: Theory and Hypotheses
The experience of the Tar-Pamlico  River Basin
trading  program,  in  that  no  trades  have  yet
been recorded,  suggests  that the potential ben-
efits  of point-nonpoint  permit trading have yet
to  be  achieved  in  full.  One  possible  explana-
tion  is the  stylized  fact,  discussed  above,  that
efficiency  gains  from  the  switch  to  perfor-
mance  standards  for  point  sources  have  re-
duced  the demand  for permits.  Before we  ac-
cept  this  explanation  too  complacently,  we
should  entertain  a  second  possibility:  trading
markets  that have been  introduced are too re-
strictive  and  too  many  bureaucratic  controls
remain so that permit exchange  is impeded by
market design.
While  there is  a  considerable  literature  ad-
dressing permit market  design, relatively little
of it  deals  with  extending  permit  markets  to
include  nonpoint  sources.  It  is  often  argued
that including  nonpoint source  pollution with-
in  a permit trading market  is difficult because
monitoring  individual  contributions  can  be
prohibitively  costly,  loadings  are  in large part
driven  by random weather  events,  and uncer-
tainty exists regarding  the effectiveness of pol-
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lution  abatement  controls  (Tomasi,  et  al.).
Since  nonpoint  source discharges  are  difficult
to  observe  at  the  individual  level,  existing
trading programs  have  resorted  to monitoring
abatement  technology  (e.g.,  best  management
practices) rather than performance.  As a result,
trade within  the point-nonpoint  source  permit
market  involves  heterogeneous  goods  (point-
source  discharges  and  nonpoint-source  best
management  practices).
Trading  ratios  have been  introduced to  al-
low for the exchange  of heterogeneous  goods
within a tradable  permit market (Mendelsohn;
Hahn).  The  trading ratio  specifies the number
of units of nonpoint  pollution reduction,  esti-
mated  by  modeling  the  effectiveness  of  the
chosen  best management  practice  (BMP)  that
must be  exchanged  for a  single  unit of point-
source pollution. The optimal  trading ratio de-
pends  on  the relative costs  of enforcing  point
and nonpoint  source  abatement  as  well as  the
uncertainty  associated  with nonpoint loadings
(Malik et al.). This uncertainty has two sourc-
es.  The  first  derives  from the  weather  driven
nature of nonpoint  source  pollution.  The  sec-
ond  is  that  there  is  considerable  uncertainty
regarding  the effectiveness  of nonpoint source
pollution  abatement  controls.  A t-ratio greater
than one  provides  a  safety margin  for the en-
vironment.  With  more than  one  unit  of (esti-
mated)  nonpoint  source  reduction  credit  re-
quired,  deviations  from  the  expected
abatement  performance  of the BMPs  are  less
likely to  result in violations  of the regulatory
standards.  To  ensure  that regulatory  goals  are
met,  the  t-ratio  tends  be  set  cautiously  high,
but  high  t-ratios  impede  trading,  thus  under-
mining the raison d'etre for permit  trading.
An  alternative  to  monitoring  technology
(e.g.,  BMPs) is to monitor the nonpoint sourc-
es on the basis of performance.  Removing  the
regulator's  uncertainty  about  the effectiveness
of the nonpoint source abatement technologies
would,  in  concept,  allow  reduction  of the  t-
ratio  and generate  an increase in the frequency
of trades.  If it is conceded  that monitoring in-
dividual nonpoint sources  on  the basis  of per-
formance is technically difficult, and thus like-
ly to be prohibitively  expensive,  arrangements
based  on  collective  monitoring  at  the  catch-
ment  level  might  be  considered.  Monitoring
pollution loads leaving the catchment is a sim-
ple  process;  the  difficulty  is  to  provide  the
right  incentives  to  individual  farmers  within
the catchment.  Griffin  and Bromley have sug-
gested  the  use  of estimated  individual  non-
point discharges,  derived from the monitoring
of total loadings  in the  catchment  determined
through  a biophysical  model relating  inputs to
loadings  and ambient  water quality standards.
Segerson  (1990)  has  suggested liability bond-
ing. The game theory  literature offers  "scape-
goat"  and "massacre"  solutions (Rasmussen),
variations  on  the  theme  that  all  firms  will
make appropriate  abatement effort if collective
performance  is monitored  and  randomly cho-
sen individuals  punished  in  the event the col-
lective  target  is not met;  schemes  for punish-
ing  all  members  of  a  group  for  shortfalls  in
collective  performance  thus  avoiding  the  ar-
bitrariness  of  "scapegoat"  and  "massacre"
while  providing  second-best  incentives  (Se-
gerson,  1988)  and  tournaments  (Govindasa-
may, Herriges,  and Shogren)  that reward firms
for  contributions  to  attainment  of abatement
targets.
Further research  is required to refine meth-
ods  for  enforcing  performance  standards  via
collective  monitoring  of  nonpoint  sources.
There  are  two  key  requirements  for  an  ac-
ceptable  collective  monitoring  and  enforce-
ment mechanism.  The  first  is that it transmits
to  group  members  clear  and  readily  compre-
hensible  incentives  that  are  consistent  with
group goals;  in effect,  incentive-compatibility
and simplicity  (which may come into conflict)
are  valued.  The  second  requirement  is  that
penalties  and rewards  imposed  on individuals
do not violate ordinary notions of fairness. Pe-
nalizing all members for a group shortfall may
be considered  unfair  to  those  group  members
who did  not shirk.  The point-nonpoint  trading
programs  introduced  thus  far  have  relatively
little  exposure  to  this  problem  because  they
involve rewarding farmers for pollution reduc-
tions rather than punishing them for exceeding
regulated levels.  Society  seems to treat denial
of a  deserved reward  as  much less  serious, in
the  moral sense,  than  imposition of  an  unde-
served  penalty:  bonuses  for  team success  are
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a  staple  of contemporary  management.  Those
who believe  that the  "polluter pays"  principle
should  be extended  to  agriculture  must, how-
ever,  deal with  the more difficult issue of spec-
ifying  justifiable  penalty  structures  for  mem-
bers  of  groups  that  collectively  violate
performance  standards.
Performance  monitoring,  if  successful,
would  reduce  the role  of technological  uncer-
tainty,  thus  allowing reduction  of the  optimal
t-ratio.  Malik,  et al. have  examined  the opti-
mal t-ratio  in a  static  setting,  and  Letson em-
phasized  that  if  technological  uncertainty  is
too  large  it  can  eliminate  the  incentive  for
point sources  to enter into trading agreements.
However,  regulatory  schemes  that  manage
technology  are inherently  static, whereas  most
water-pollution  problems  exist  in  a  dynamic
world,  with  technology  that  is  constantly
changing.  It is important to assess how the lev-
el  of trading will  adjust  and  adapt  to changes
in  the  ability  of regulators  to  monitor  BMP
effectiveness  in reducing  effluents  and the re-
lationship between nonpoint effluent reduction
and  ambient  water quality.
Our  central  hypotheses  are  that  adopting
performance  standards  rather than  technology
standards  in  point-nonpoint  trading  programs
will  reduce  the  costs  of  pollution  abatement
within a watershed,  and that with performance
standards  the t-ratio may be adjusted over time
as  innovation improves  the  technology  avail-
able  for  reducing  nonpoint  source  pollution.
The efficiency  of permit markets requires min-
imum t-ratios consistent with prudent environ-
mental  regulation.  These  hypothesized  gains
would  result  from  allowing  nonpoint  source
polluters  in  trading  markets  to  determine  the
optimal  technology,  rather  than having  a cau-
tious  regulator  choose  the  technology  and
hedge  against  uncertain  performance  by  im-
posing  a high  t-ratio.
A  performance-based  system  would  focus
on  monitoring  overall  pollution  levels  and  it
would  establish  individual  incentives  among
nonpoint sources  through the use of some col-
lective enforcement  mechanism.  Point sources
would  be  able  to  purchase  a  given  level  of
nonpoint  source  pollution  reduction  and  the
nonpoint  sources  would  have  their  choice  of
mechanisms  to reduce their pollution discharg-
es.  Uncertainty  as  to  the  effectiveness  of on-
farm  abatement  technology  is  borne  by  the
farmers  (who  are  best  able  to  handle  it),  al-
lowing greater  efficiency  in the permit market
as regulators  and point  source polluters  enjoy
a  higher  level  of certainty.  All  parties  would
gain  from  the  increased  efficiency  of  permit
markets.  Nevertheless,  some  uncertainty  re-
mains  because  neither polluters  nor the regu-
lators  know  the  exact  relationship  between
nonpoint source reductions  and ambient water
quality.
A  natural  question  that  arises in  a perfor-
mance-based  system is the choice  of enforce-
ment mechanisms.  An objective of our on-go-
ing research  is  to survey  the literature,  assess
the  different  mechanisms  suggested,  and  de-
velop  and  assess  new  or  modified  mecha-
nisms. The  choice  of enforcement  mechanism
has  important  implications  for  the  feasibility
of a  performance-based  system  due  to uncer-
tainty  about  the  effectiveness  of  nonpoint
source  pollution  reductions  and  risk  aversion
of permit  market  participants  and the regula-
tor. High  levels  of risk  aversion and  high un-
certainty reduce the scope for trade and hence
the  efficiency  and  welfare  gains  from  permit
trading.
Conclusions
Our  comments  have  addressed  three  major
themes:  (1)  recognition that  solutions  to agri-
cultural  environmental  problems  will  take  a
variety  of institutional  forms,  (2)  the expand-
ing  role  of incentive-based  policies  including
voluntary  agreements  and  pollution  trading
programs  of various  kinds  in  many  countries
and  applied  to  many  kinds  of environmental
problems,  and  (3)  the  prospective  gains  that
attend  implementation  of  trading  programs
based  on  performance  standards  rather  than
technology  standards.
Creativity and Eclecticism in Building
Trading Institutions
Trading  programs  allow,  in  principle,  for  the
inclusion  of a  wide  range  of trading  partners
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including point  sources,  nonpoint sources,  lo-
cal  governments,  and  federal  agencies.  As
seen  in  the  examples  above,  trading  regimes
do not necessarily have to be developed in the
traditional sense discussed by economists  or as
pioneered  under Title IV of the Clean Air Act
Amendments  of  1990.  Opportunities  for  trad-
ing can be created at many different levels and
scales.  For  example,  point  sources  may trade
with  other  point  sources  or  with  nonpoint
sources,  nonpoint sources may trade with non-
point  sources,  or  government  agencies  may
trade with other government  agencies. Trading
may  be  formal  or informal,  and  enforcement
of agreements  made  may be rigid  or to  some
extent negotiable.
Despite this diversity  of institutional forms
for trading, some principles for success can be
identified.  Two  in  particular  deserve  special
attention:  a  long-term  and  broadly  inclusive
process  and  markets  scaled  appropriately  for
the problem  at hand.
A  Long-term Process Involving All  of the
Legitimate Interests.  Trading  mechanisms
bring together  all of the stakeholders  with the
regulatory agency.  The process of establishing
a trading system  identifies  all relevant sources
of  environmental  degradation,  identifies  the
potential  trading  parties,  and  creates  avenues
of  communication.  The  commitment  of gov-
ernment  minimizes  institutional  uncertainty,
and  the promise  of gains from  trade provides
the glue that keeps  participants  in the game.
Problem-scale Trading Markets.  Environ-
mental performance  typically  has a  strong re-
gional dimension:  there  are good reasons why
ambient  pollution  targets  are  defined  at  the
catchment  level  and  compensating  wetlands
must  be  located  with due  respect  to  aquifers
and  ecological  boundaries.  The  geographical
boundaries  of  wetlands  mitigation  banking
districts  and pollution  permit  trading markets
should respect these considerations,  as well as
the  need  to  be  large  enough  to  avoid  "thin
markets"  yet small  enough  for administrative
efficiency.
Wetlands  can  be  mitigated  on-site  or  in
larger  mitigation  banks  many miles  from  the
conversion  area.  Wetlands  mitigation depends
upon  evaluations  of wetland  quality  and  the
probable  success of habitat creation.  Loss of a
wetland that is non-unique may be offset with
contributions to an offsite mitigation bank pro-
viding  greater  habitat  than  the  original  acre-
age,  while  unique  or highly  critical  wetlands
may  require  on-site  mitigation  to prevent  se-
rious local  habitat  loss.
Many factors play into the determination of
appropriate  scale  and distance  in water pollu-
tion trading  schemes.  But  the immutable  fact
that water tends  to flow downhill provides  an
enduring organizing principle:  trading markets
should  be  delimited  by  hydrological  bound-
aries  such as  catchments  and  watersheds.
Performance-based  Trading Prospects  for
Agriculture
Regulatory  institutions that provide private in-
centives  hold  the potential  for improving  the
environmental  performance  of  agriculture.
"No net loss" provisions  and mitigation bank-
ing  hold  the promise  of maintaining  and  en-
hancing  wetlands  with  minimal  disruption  to
the  land economy.  Rather  than the  traditional
public  provision  of cost-share  assistance,  in-
novative point-nonpoint  pollution trading pro-
grams provide private  incentives  for pollution
abatement  on  farms.  The  institutions  for pol-
lution trading  can vary  greatly: from informal
to  formal,  from  technology  to  performance
based,  and  from  market-clearing  to  adminis-
tered-price trading.  This variety in trading pro-
grams  demonstrates  creative  institutional  ad-
aptation  to  the  circumstances  at  hand.
Nevertheless,  we are convinced  there  are con-
siderable  gains  to be had  from further  refine-
ment of some  of these trading  programs.
Wetlands  mitigation  works  in  the  north-
western  two-thirds of Ohio,  which  is naturally
a  vast  wooded  wetland,  and  supports  agricul-
tural  and urban development  only with  the  aid
of extensive  artificial drainage.  For most of the
US,  however,  wetlands  mitigation  has  had
mixed  success,  and  failed  mitigation  projects
occur  often  enough  to  cast  a  shadow  on  the
whole process.  Regulators are currently moving
toward  performance-based  mitigation  banking
by introducing  a hydrogeomorphic  approach.
Although  existing  cost-share programs  can
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change farmer  practices,  reducing  agricultural
pollution, they rely heavily  on subsidizing  ap-
proved  technologies.  The  point-nonpoint  pol-
lution trading  programs  that have been  intro-
duced thus  far  have also applied a technology
standards  approach  on the nonpoint side of the
market.  One  distinguishing  feature  of  many
tradable  pollution  permit programs  applied  to
point  sources  is  that  they  require  regulatory
agencies  to  monitor  performance  rather  than
the installation  of abatement  technology.
Performance  standards  shift  the  burden  of
uncertainty  from  regulators  to  polluters  who
have  access  to  information  of  various  kinds
that is unavailable  to the regulator.  Under  the
current  regime,  where  cost-share  incentives
are  based  on technological  inputs,  the regula-
tors  face  all  of the  uncertainty  about  perfor-
mance  of  BMPs.  Under  a  performance-based
trading  system,  however,  the parties  involved
in the trade would be held liable for non-com-
pliance  with  water  quality  standards,  placing
the  burden  of  uncertainty  on the  parties  best
able  to adapt  to it.
Under current technology-based  point-non-
point trading  arrangements,  regulators  impose
trading  ratios  to  provide  a  measure  of assur-
ance  that  environmental  targets  are  met  via
pollution  trading.  Yet  high t-ratios,  which re-
duce  potential  gains  from trade,  can  provide
serious  impediments  to  the success  of trading
programs.  A  switch  to  performance-based
trading  seems  warranted,  but runs  counter  to
traditional  insistence  that that nonpoint pollu-
tion  cannot  be  monitored  at  the  source.  The
day  is  not  far  away,  technological  optimists
tell us, when  effective and inexpensive  spy-in-
the-sky monitoring technology will render this
objection  moot.  Alternatively,  collective  en-
forcement  at  the  (sub)-catchment  level  would
permit  introduction  of  performance-based
point-nonpoint  pollution  trading  today.  The
opportunity  for  considerably  enhanced  gains
from trade may be sufficient to induce farmers
to  accept  collective  enforcement  of  trading
commitments.
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